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tions which have bifurcated trial procedures, new penalty trials.
Such cases should be rare, however, since it is unlikely that
judges will sustain challenges for cause on the basis of conscien-
tious scruples now that the United States Supreme Court and
the Louisiana legislature 4 have spoken. The factors which make
a second trial for a habeas corpus petitioner potentially hazardous
for the state are not likely to be present at the second trial of
a defendant who has appealed and is retried shortly afterward.
It should be noted, however, that although the United States
Supreme Court in Witherspoon refused to hold that exclusion
of prospective jurors conscientiously opposed to the death penalty
results in a jury prejudiced on the issue of guilt,85 the Court
has not foreclosed the possibility of such a holding in the future.86
Courts which grant new trials for violations of the new consti-
tutional rule may, therefore, be following a wise course.
Larry C. Becnel
THE RIGHTS OF THE VENDOR IN REDHIBITION
The Louisiana Civil Code, while dealing extensively with
the buyer's rights, is practically silent concerning the rights of
the seller in a successful redhibitory action. Since each of the
parties to a sale would like to be able to predict the legal con-
sequences flowing from their transaction, the extent of liability
and the available remedies are of utmost importance to the
vendor. If a vendor sells a thing with redhibitory defects, three
situations can arise. First, the thing can be defective to the point
of total uselessness, in which case the total avoidance of the sale
provides a fair remedy for both parties. Being totally defective,
neither would the thing be capable of producing fruits nor would
it have any use value for the buyer; therefore, the seller would
34. IA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 798 was amended after the Witherspoon deci-
sion and it is no longer permissible to challenge prospective jurors for cause
simply because they express conscientious or religious scruples against capi-
tal punishment. La. Acts 1968, E.S., No. 13, § 1.
35. The Court again rejected the "prosecution-prone" theory In Bumper
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968).
36. The Court said: "We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of
the record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclu-
sion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative
jury on the issue of guilt .... Witherspoon .v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18
1968) (emphasis added).
Justice Black, dissenting, said: "For the majority opinion goes out of
its way to state that in some future case a defendant might well establish
that a jury selected in the way the Illinois statute here provides is 'less than
neutral with respect to guilt.'" Id. at 539 (emphasis in the original.)
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only be entitled to the return of the thing.' Secondly, the thing
may be only partially defective, in which case the court can
decree a reduction in price to balance the reduction in utility of
the thing. The seller has sold only a partially useful thing; there-
fore, he is entitled only to a partial price.2 Finally, the thing can
be so defective as to warrant avoidance of the sale when the court
decides the buyer would not have purchased the thing if he had
known of these defects,8 and yet, the buyer may have enjoyed
an appreciable amount of use from the thing or may have drawn
fruits therefrom. By treating this situation as if the thing were
totally defective, the courts have allowed the buyer to gain
more from the transaction than the Code allows. Although the
Code makes it clear that the buyer's right to recover the expenses
of the sale may be diminished by the value of the fruits he has
drawn from the thing, it is unclear whether he must account
for fruits in excess of expenses, and also silent insofar as the
seller's right to recover for the buyer's use of the thing.
The line of jurisprudence dealing with a seller's claim for
fruits or use value began with Farmer v. Fisk, 4 when a buyer
sought the resolution of the sale of a habitual runaway slave.
The defendant-vendor requested an instruction that it was the
jury's duty to deduct from the purchase price the fruits of the
thing sold which were produced while the buyer had possession
of the slave. Strictly speaking, the seller was not asking for the
value of the use of the slave, but for the fruits he produced,
which under the then-existing law would have been the children
of the slave.5 The court, in denying his request and without draw-
ing a clear distinction between usus and fructus, formulated the
rule that the seller's use of the price is equivalent to the
buyer's use of the thing.6 The same result was reached three
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2520.
2. Id. art. 2543.
3. Id. art. 2520.
4. 9 Rob. 351 (La. 1844).
5. La. Civ. Code arts. 491, 492, 539 (1825).
6. Cf. Farmer v. Fisk, 9 Rob. 351, 352 (La. 1844): "As to the fruits of the
thing sold, the sale was a cash one. If the purchaser, on the one hand, re-
ceived the services of the slave, the vendor on the other, enjoyed the interest
of the purchase money. The one may well be considered as an equivalent
for the other. 2 Troplong, Vents Nos. 571, 572" (emphasis added). As for the
correctness of this rule and the authority cited by the court, see note 42
infra. Laurent suggests that If the thing sold produces no fruits during the
time between the sale and the resolution it is practical to equate the use of
the price to the use of the thing. 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CML FRANgAIS
no 554 (1877). Very little calculation is needed to demonstrate that the in-
terest on $4,000 in one year is much less than the fair rental value of a
partially defective $4,000 car for one year. It is neither practical nor equitable
to equate the two sums.
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years later in Harvey v. Kendall7 in which the vendor specifically
asked for compensation for the services of the slave. The court
cited no authority for its conclusion.
The next important case on the subject was in the automo-
bile age.8 The plaintiff, in Rousseau & Co. v. DoleseO formerly
the defendant in a successful redhibitory action concerning the
sale of a car, claimed that he was entitled to the rental value of
the car for the ten months that the buyer had possession of it.
The court distinguished between resolution and rescission,10
citing George v. Lewis," and suggested that the plaintiff was
confusing a contract voided for redhibitory defects in the thing
sold with one which has been dissolved under the dissolving
condition.1 2 The court felt the former theory was the only pos-
sible one in redhibition. In denying plaintiff's claim of unjust
enrichment, the court relied on the rule of equivalents and char-
acterized plaintiff's request as "inconceivable.""8
In a subsequent case the plaintiff was successful in "re-
scinding"'14 the sale of a defective car, but the district court or-
dered the vendor to return the purchase price less $500. It con-
7. 2 La. Ann. 748, 749 (1847): "The defendant contends that he should be
allowed compensation for the services of the slave while in the plaintiff's
possession. The sale was for cash. The use of the money paid as the price
stands as an offset against the services of the slave."
8. There was one decision directly to the contrary in the interval between
1847 and 1928, but it is very rarely reported and completely ignored in the
Jurisprudence. See Hill, Fontaine & Co. v. Cherry, Gunby's Dec. 45 (2d Cir.
1885). Apparently the buyer had the sale of some horses resolved for de-
fects. The syllabus reads: "Where the sale is annulled, the buyer owes rent
for the stock during the time he has used them." Id.
9. 8 La. App. 785 (Ist Cir. 1928).
10. Id. at 787: "In seeking the avoidance of such a contract it cannot
possibly be said that its execution or enforcement is sought or asked. It is
the very opposite of a demand for the dissolution of a commutative contract
under the resolutory condition, as in such a suit, as hereinabove explained,
the contract is not attacked, but its execution is demanded to carry out the
obligations of the parties thereunder." But see note 26 4nftra.
11. 11 La. Ann. 654 (1856). This decision correctly makes the distinction
between resolution and rescission, but it is not authority for the proposition
that a redhibitory action is one of rescission.
12. For a further discussion as to who was confused, see note 40 infra.
13. Rousseau & Co. v. Dolese, 8 La. App. 785, 787 (1st Cir. 1928): "Defen-
dant was to be the owner of the thing sold and plaintiff [the owner] of the
money which defendant paid him for it. The possession of defendant was as
owner, and the use of the auto was as such. His possession as owner makes
it evident that his use was to be free of charge to the plaintiff. It is incon-
ceivable that defendant could have thought for a moment that he would be
charged rent for the use of an auto he had paid for in good faith and that
he was using as proprietor." The court also cited Farmer v. Fisk, 9 Rob. 351
(La. 1844); 2 TROPLONG, DRorr CIVIL SXPLIQUh, DI LA VNTS nos 571-572, 575 (5th
ed. 1856). Troplong is not authority for the proposition stated in this case.
See note 42 4nfra.
14. Quotations added.
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sidered the $500 to be the fair value which inured to plaintiff
during the year he used the car. In its oral reasons for judge-
ment the court cited no authority,5 but apparently based the
decision on common sense and fairness. The First Circuit Court
of Appeal in Bergeron v. Mid-City Motors, Inc.,16 adopted the
trial court's reasoning and affirmed the judgment. A similar situ-
ation arose one year later in the Fourth Circuit. The defendant-
vendor, in Williams v. Daste, 7 was granted the excess in rents
collected by the buyer while he was in possession of a defective
house over and above the expenses occasioned by the sale. While
granting the vendor's request for the fruits-revenues, or excess
in rents, 8 the court made it very clear that if the vendor had
sought rent for the buyer's occupancy, his claim would have
been denied on the basis of the older authorities. 9 This circuit
apparently reversed its position three years later in Kiefer v.
Bernie Dumas Buick Co.,20 by ordering the vendor of a defective
car to return the purchase price to the plaintiff-buyer less a
$1,000 credit to cover the use by the buyer of the car. The rea-
soning of the trial court was adopted without discussion, despite
the allegation by the plaintiff-buyer that it was error to allow
such a credit. The trial court reasoned that since the car was
not completely useless it had a fair use value of slightly less
than $100 per month, for twenty months, minus the buyer's
troubles and aggravation, for a total of $1,000. The Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal relied on the Bergeron case in affirming the
judgment despite the court's finding that the vendor fraudulently
concealed the defects in the car and represented it as undam-
aged. In the most recent case on the subject, Gauche v. Ford
Motor Co.,21 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal spoke approv-
ingly of the Bergeron case and allowed the seller a $500 credit
for the buyer's use of the car.22 The trend of these recent cases
15. The trial judge's oral analysis is reproduced in Bergeron v. Mid-City
Motors, Inc., 162 So.2d 835 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
16. Id.
17. 181 So.2d 247 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 248 La. 916, 182
So.2d 664 (1966).
18. See LA. CIrv. CODE art. 2531; Comment, 4 TU. L. REv. 627, 629 (1930).
19. See Williams v. Daste, 181 So.2d 247, 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), and
the authorities cited by the court. See also Farmer v. Fisk, 9 Rob. 351 (La.
1844); Rousseau & Co. v. Dolese, 8 La. App. 785 (1st Cir. 1928); Comment,
4 TUL. L. REv. 627, 628 (1930).
20. 210 So.2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
21. 226 So.2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
22. Actually, there was no need to allow a credit in this case because the
buyer resold the defective car before bringing suit. No restitution of the car
was made to the seller, so the buyer owed nothing for its use. The court
merely granted a reduction in price; therefore, there was no occasion to
19701
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in the First and Fourth Circuits is to allow the seller to recover
for the buyer's use of the thing. This trend began without citing
any legal authority and in the face of older decisions to the con-
trary.
The Louisiana courts seem to agree that in the case of a true
resolution of a sale the vendor is entitled to the return of the
fruits in the form of the rental value of the thing sold,28 but the
jurisprudence, until the time of Bergeron, indicated that the
redhibitory action was one of rescission, and the vendor had no
claim for use value.
What effect does this distinction between resolution and
rescission have on the vendor's remedy?24 Apparently the courts
feel that no restitution is possible when rescission takes place,
consider the loss of use of the car to the seller-the partial price was the
equivalent of the partial utility of the car. However, the court did voice ap-
proval of Bergeron.
23. There is no specific Code provision allowing the seller to recover
for the buyer's use, unless every time a contract is resolved the parties
must resort to the principles of unjust enrichment contained in article 1965
to bring about a restitution. The courts clear this obstacle by relying on
the principles of restitution in Roman law and article 2045 of the Civil Code
to allow the seller to collect fruits measured by the rental value that the
thing sold was capable of producing. This method achieves the same result
as allowing the seller to collect for the buyer's use of the thing sold. See
Derepas v. Shallus, 15 La. Ann. 351, 373 (1840): "The effect of the dissolution
of a sale, is to replace the parties in the situation in which they stood be-
fore the contract .... The rents of a house are the fruits which that kind
of property is susceptible of producing .... The plaintiff [is] entitled to
the rents of the house, as damages or fruits to be paid by defendant ......
See also Cappel v. Meeker Sugar Refining Co., 169 La. 1170, 126 So. 695
(1930); Cappel v. Hundley, 168 La. 15, 20, 121 So. 176, 178 (1929); Vincent v.
Phillips, 47 La. Ann. 1238, 17 So. 786 (1895); Ware v. Berlin, 43 La. 534, 9 So.
490 (1891); McKenzie v. Bacon, 41 La. 6, 5 So. 640 (1889); Edwards v. White,
34 La. 989 (1882); School Directors v. Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 739 (1876). Cf.
F. MACKELDEY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW § 220 (Dropsie transl. 1883):
"The Roman restitutio in integrum, or restoration to the previous condition,
was effected by the praetor for equitable causes, on the prayer of an injured
party, by annulling a transaction valid by the strict law . . . and restoring
the parties to their previous legal relations." See also id. at § 220 n. 6:
"[Hience it is also termed restoration of the loss because of the civil law
or restoration (redintegratio causae jure civlli amissae, or Instauratio ne-
gotii)" (emphasis added).
24. Comment, 4 TUL. L. Rzv. 433, 627 (1930) explains that in the case of
a resolution of a sale, as for non-payment of the purchase price, the vendor
can recover for the buyer's use of the thing sold. This is enforcing a part
of the contract, the resolutory condition, and since the contract is valid
until resolved the buyer must pay for his use. "Whereas, in the case of re-
scission, the vice taints the sale ab initio, and hence there is no enforcement
of an obligation, but as a matter of fact it is annulling the contract. There-
fore, the vendor cannot collect for the use of the thing-there being no
obligation." Id. at 627-28.
Probably the writer means that in resolution, since the contract ex-
ists until It is resolved, there is a just cause on which to base a claim for
restitution. No restitution is granted when the contract is void or voidable
under the civil law. See F. MACKELDEY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW § 221
(Dropsie transl. 1883).
but since the redhibitory action is actually one of resolution,
restitution should be available, and the vendor should have a
claim for the buyer's use of the thing sold.
The difference between rescission and resolution, and the
impropriety of classifying the redhibitory action as one of re-
scission can be seen by analogizing the action in warranty against
eviction and the redhibitory action. Both of these actions are
the result of the seller's obligation to warrant the thing he sells.25
It follows that the redhibitory action is not one in rescission
basically because it has nothing to do with vitiating the buyer's
consent. Instead, it is the failure of the seller to carry out his
obligation to deliver a thing free from defects which gives the
buyer the right to seek a resolution of the sale. 26 When one of
the parties to a commutative contract does not comply with his
obligations, the other has a right to invoke the implied resolutory
condition.2 The vendor should then be entitled to a restitutio in
integrum28 wherein he is returned the thing plus the revenues
it was susceptible of producing during the time of the buyer's
possession measured by the fair rental value standard.29
The reasoning and analysis of the cases before Williams v.
25. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2475, 2476.
26. See 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS nos 277, 286 (1877):
"nO 277 The buyer demands the resolution of the contract, or the restitution
of a part of the price; this supposes that the vendor has not at all fulfilled
his obligation; and in effect, he has not fulfilled it when he delivers to the
buyer a defective thing within the meaning of article 1641. In this sense,
there is an analogy between eviction and redhibitory vices; in the two cases,
the right of the buyer is founded upon the tacit resolutory condition that the
law implies in synallagmatic contracts ....
"no 286 [T]he guarantee is founded on the inexecution of the obligations
contracted by the vendor; but, when he sells a thing free from defects, he
satisfies his obligation; it follows that the buyer does not have any action
against him" (transl. by author).
"no 277 "L'acheteur demande la resolution du contrat, ou la restitution
d'une partie du prix; cela suppose que le vendeur n'a point rempl4 son obliga-
tion; et, en eflet, 41 ne 7a remplit pas guand Q1 livre d l'acheteur une chose
vicide dan le sens de l'article 1641. Sous ce rapport, il y a analogie entre
1'dviction et lea vices rtdhibitoires; dans lea deux cas, le droit de l'acheteur
est fondd sur la condition rdsolutoire tacite que la lot sous-entend dane lea
contrats sjnallagmatiques .... 
"no 286 [L]a garantie eat fondde sur l'4nexecution des obligations con-
tractds par le vendeur; or, quand il vend une chose non vicide, Q1 satisfait 4
sea obligations; par suite, l'acheteur ne peut avoir aucune action contra lI."
27. See LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2046.
28. Cf. Rousseau & Co. v. Dolese, 8 La. App. 785, 786 (1st Cir. 1928).
29, See note 23 supra. Comment, 4 TUL. L. REv. 627, 628 (1930) cites what
on first glance is a contrary view, TROPLONa, DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUa, DE LA
VENTS no 575 (1836): "Le contrat eat rdsolu . . . le vendeur reprend la
chose en l'tat o,& elle se trouve, et P'acheteur recouvre son argent sans
dommages et intdrdts." (Emphasis added.) It is most Interesting to no-
tice that the authority for this detail Is here speaking of resolution, not
rescission. This statement Is authority only for the view that the buyer has
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Daste is summarized in a Comment on the nature of the redhibi-
tory action 0 which distinguishes between resolution and rescis-
sion: "The rescission implies the total avoidance of the conven-
tion of the parties for some inherent defect therein."' 31 These dis-
tinctions are correct, but they do not clearly establish that the
Louisiana Civil Code defines the redhibitory action as one of
rescission.3 2 It is true that the courts invariably use the term
"rescission" 83 when speaking of redhibition, but this does not
make the usage correct. The courts have used the term "rescis-
sion" from the early days of our jurisprudence, 34 but this is
probably the result of the unfortunate use of the words "void
sale" in an early opinion dealing with redhibition 5 and a pro-
gressive mistranslation in the Louisiana Civil Code.
no claim for damages if the seller is in good faith. Most of the French au-
thorities agree that the vendor is entitled to the fruits. See 5 AUBR" ET RAu,
DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 355 bis (6th ed. 1946); 19 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIN ET
SAIGNAT, TRAITI THAORIQU ET PRACTIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL no 435 (3d ed. 1908); 1
GUILLOUARD, TRAITOS DE LA VENTS ET L'ECHANGE no 461 (2d ed. 1890); 3 OEUVRES
DS POTHIER, TRAITA DE CONTRAT DE VENTE no 217 (2d ed. 1861); 2 TROPLONG, DROIT
IaIL EXPLIQU ; DE LA VENTE nos 572-573 (5th ed. 1856).
30. Comment, 4 TUL. L. REv. 433, 627 (1930).
31. Id. at 434 (emphasis added). The author's authority for this distinc-
tion is 4 TOULLIER-DUVERGIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 551 (6th ed. 1846): "Reso-
lution is a general term which includes all manners of resolving contracts;
rescission is particular to those which contain an intrinsic vice, which is
opposed to their perfection.
"Rescission supposes on the contrary that there had existed only the
appearance of a contract; but that it has never had an actual existence,
because the vices which had accompanied it have opposed themselves to its
perfection.
"One rescinds, therefore, contracts void for an intrinsic cause which
goes back to their birth, as contracts infected with fraud, error, violence,
etc.; one resolves contracts intrinsically valid in their origin but which
posterior causes destroy." (Transl. from Comment, 4 Tul. L. Rev. 433, 434
(1930); emphasis by author of this Note.)
The above emphasized words seem to have suggested redhibitory vices
to the author and the courts. In fact, vices which prevent the perfection
of contracts are vices of consent, such as fraud, violence, error, etc., as
Toullier suggests. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1779, 1819; FRENCH CIV. CODE arts.
1108, 1109. In a redhibitory action the posterior cause of destruction men-
tioned above is the seller's failure to deliver a thing free from defects as
warranted. See note 26 infra.
32. Cf. Comment, 4 TUL. L. REV. 433, 435 (1930); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2520;
"Redhibition is the avoidance of the sale on account of some vice or defect
in the thing sold . . ." (emphasis added). The emphasized words do seem
to suggest rescission for a vice of consent.
33. See Comment, 4 TUL. L. REv. 433, 435 n.7 (1930).
34. See, e.g., Reech v. Coco, 223 La. 346, 65 So.2d 790 (1953); Savoie v.
Snell, 213 La. 823, 35 So.2d 745 (1948); Riggs v. Duperrier, 19 La. 418 (1841);
Nelson v. Lillard, 16 La. 336 (1840); Beale's Heirs v. De Gruy, 2 La. 468
(1831); Bloudean v. Gales, 8 Mart.(O.S.) 313 (La. 1820); Dewees v. Morgan,
1 Mart.(O.S.) 1 (La. 1809); Kiefer v. Bernie Dumas Buick Co., 210 So.2d 569
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Daste, 181 So.2d 247 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965); Bergeron v. Mid-City Motors, Inc., 162 So.2d 835 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1964).
35. Dewees v. Morgan, 1 Mart.(O.S.) 1 (La. 1809). "Void" is more cor-
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The Digest of 1808 uses the term "rsolution" in the French
version, and the term "cancellation" in the English version.3 6
The Code of 1825 uses the term "avoidance" in the English ver-
sion, but retains that word "'rsolution" in the French version.3 7
Finally, the Revised Civil Code of 1870 keeps the term "avoid-
ance."8 Since "avoidance" and "vice" do seem to suggest nullity
and rescission, the error is the logical result of the mistransla-
tion.89 The French commentators overwhelmingly use the term
"rsolution" when speaking of the redhibitory action.4
rectly associated with "null," "nullity," and "rescission." The use of the term
"void" understandably led to the use of "rescission."
36. La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, tit. VI, art. 65: "On appelle rddhibitfon, le
rdsolution de la vente .... The corresponding English version reads: "Red-
hibition is the cancelling of the sale ... .
37. La. Civ. Code art. 2496 (1825): "Redhibition is called the avoidance
of the sale. . . ." The French version Is unchanged.
38. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2520: "Redhtbition is the avoidance of a sale...."
39. Comment, 4 TUL. L. REV. 433, 627 (1930) does not mention articles
2529 and 2547 of the Louisiana Civil Code, but these two articles are greatly
responsible for the association of redhibition with the concept of error and
rescission. These articles concern the situations (good faith and bad faith)
in which the seller declares the thing sold to have a specific quality. The
articles speak of fraud, principal motive, and damages: all concepts con-
cerning vices of consent and rescission in Book III, Chapter 2 of the Code.
An error as to a substantial quality is treated in article 1844 as a cause for
rescinding the contract, and it comes under the heading of fraud when the
seller Is in bad faith. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1847(4).
Articles 2529 and 2547 have no equivalent in the French Code Napoleon.
The French make it quite clear that the lack of a declared quality is not
a redhibitory vice, but error which makes the contract subject to the action
for rescission with a ten-year prescriptive period. See 10 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 126 (1932); 5 AUBRY sr RAU, DROIT
CIVIL FRANgAiS, no 355 bis (6th ed. 1946); 10 T. Huc, COMMENTAIRE THIRORIQUE
ET PRATIQUE DE CODE CIVIL no 142 (1897); 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANqAIs no 281 (1877).
It is still somewhat of a mystery why the draftsmen chose to Include
these two articles In the section of the Code dealing with redhibition. Per-
haps they were originally inserted to refer the reader back to Book III,
Chapter 2, for the rules covering error as to a substantial quality. There is
a rather fine practical distinction between a redhibitory vice and such an
error, and these articles could have been intended to clarify the distinction.
However, in the transition from the Digest of 1808 to the Revised Civil Code
of 1870, the words "the buyer shall be well founded to claim . . the can-
celling of the sale" evolved into "gives rise to redhibition." Confusion, in-
stead of clarification, is the result.
There is no great objection to adopting the French view and restricting
the meaning of articles 2529 and 2547. An example will demonstrate that the
lack of a substantial quality is error: If B asks A to sell him a car, A war-
rants that the car is free from redhibitory defects: malfunctioning brakes,
corroded electrical system, or a misfiring motor. But if B tells A that he is
a race driver and wants a fast car, and A declares that "this car will go 200
m.p.h.," and it develops that the car will not go 200 m.p.h., there Is error
as to a substantial quality. The car is not defective In any manner; it sim-
ply does not have the declared quality.
40. See 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DH DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS nos 277-278, 286, 292-
293 (1877):
"no 293 The effects of the redhibitory action are those of every action
in resolution" (author's transl.).
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Another obstacle to the vendor's recovery in the earlier cases
was the equivalents rule which equates the buyer's use of the
thing to the interest received by the seller on the purchase
price.41 The rule is somewhat unfair and without support among
most of the French commentators and courts.42 The rule could
only work adequately in the case of a cash sale wherein the
seller has the use of the full price. The provisions of the Civil
Code are applicable to both cash and credit sales, and they
strongly imply a solution contrary to the jurisprudentially cre-
ated rule of equivalents. The vendor in redhibition is entitled
to these fruits after deducting from them the expenses occasioned
by the sale.48
Why the courts initially denied relief to vendors in redhibi-
tory actions was probably the result of mistranslation, confusion
of proper terminology, and, possibly, certain concepts of fault.
On first impression it seems that a seller is at fault for selling a
thing which is defective, but a good faith vendor actually sells
things which contain latent defects that are noticeable only upon
inspection, and sometimes, use. The French commentators feel
that the vendor in this situation is less at fault than the seller
"no 293 Les effets de l'action rddh4bitotre sont ceux de toute action en
r~solution."
See also 9 BUDANT, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS n° 260 (2d ed. 1934).
"no 260 [Tihe redhibitory action is an action in resolution like the re-
course in warranty for eviction . . . ." (Author's transl.)
"nO 260 L'aotion rddhibitoire est une action en rdsolution comme le recours
en garantie pour d'iction .... "
Cf. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS EULMENTAIRE DE DR01T CIVIL FRANCAIS no 580
(9th ed. 1935); 19 BAUDRY-LAcANTINERIw ET SAIGNAT, TRArrk THIRORIQUO ET
PRATIQUE DE DROrr CIVIL no 435 (3d ed. 1908); 10 T. Huc, COMMENTAIRE TH)0RIQUE
DE CODO CIVIL no 151 (1897); 1 GUILLOUASD, TRAITAS DO LA VENTE ET DO L'ECHANGE
no 461 (2d ed. 1890); 2 TROPLONG, DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUII, DO LA VENTE nos 572-573,
575 (5th ed. 1856).
41. Farmer v. Fisk, 9 Rob. 351 (La. 1844). See note 6 supra, wherein the
court confuses fruits and use and emerges with the equivalents rule.
42. In Farmer v. Fisk, 9 Rob. 351, 352 (La. 1844), the court cites Troplong
as authority for the equivalents rule. Actually Troplong and most of the
French commentators agree that the fruits of the thing are compensated
with the interests on the price. They do not say that the two are equivalent.
Compensation is the extinguishing of two debts, when they exist simulta-
neously, to the amount of their respective sums; it is not cancellation on a
one debt-to-one debt basis. See LA. CIV. CODS art. 2208. See also 2 TROPLONG,
DROIT CIVIL UXPLIQUh, DO LA VENTS no 571 (5th ed. 1956) "no 571 [Blut, in France,
the fruits of the thing are always compensated with the interests on the
price . . ." (author's transl.).
"no 571 Mais, en France, on compense toujours les fruits de la oose
avec les interets du prix .... "
See also 10 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, Tarrt PRATIQUE DS DROIT CIVIL PRANCAVS no
184 (1932); OSUVRES DE POTHIER, TRAITA DE CONTRAT DO VENTE no 217 (2d ed.
1861); Civ., 17 juillet 1924, Gaz. Pal., 1924, II, 378; Cass., 23 juillet 1834; Sirey,
1934, I, 620.
43. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2531; Comment, 4 TuL. L. Rzv. 627, 629 (1930).
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who allows his vendee to be evicted,44 but the action in warranty
against eviction is unquestionably an action in resolution.45 It
does not follow then that the courts should classify the redhibi-
tory action as one of rescission on the theory that the seller's
fault restricts his remedy.
Aside from the benefit to the seller, there is much to be
gained by bringing the redhibitory action back into the family
of resolutory actions. The Civil Code takes on a more logical,
consistent meaning when this subject is treated as an obligation
of the seller, as the Code classifies it. 4" In addition, the courts
could reach an appropriate solution in every case of redhibition
by following the rules applicable to actions in resolution and the
Code articles relating to redhibition. Where the sale is dissolved
but the buyer has received some use and/or fruits from the thing,
the courts should follow their practice of allowing the seller the
return of the thing plus the revenues it was capable of produc-
ing in its defective condition.47 It would be anomalous to allow
44. See 2 TROPLONG, DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUA, DE LA VENTm no 572 (5th ed. 1856).
45. The failure to carry out the obligation to warrant the buyer against
eviction is a perfect example of a posterior cause which brings about the
resolution of a sale. See also 2 TROPLONG, DRorr CIVIL EXPLIQUfI, DE LA VENTE,
no 572 (5th ed. 1856).
It may seem inconsistent to allow the buyer who is evicted to keep the
fruits of the thing sold, but it must be remembered that the Civil Code
articles dealing with sales are intended to cover specific situations, not
general remedies. The remedies in each situation are based on the exigencies
of each situation. The evicted buyer is entitled to the fruits only when he
was in good faith on the day of the sale and later came to be in bad faith.
Consideration is given to the fact that the eviction is caused by a third
person, not by the voluntary act of the buyer who conserved the fruits.
Finally, in the case of the evicted buyer, the seller is more at fault than the
seller in redhibition. He has failed in his primary obligation to guarantee
the buyer the peaceable possession of the thing sold; or in modern terms,
he has failed to make the buyer owner of the thing. The seller in redhibi-
tion has only failed in the subsidiary obligation to see that the thing sold
is free from defects. See PLANIOL ET R PERT, TRArIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
FRAN AIS nos 88, 95, 116 (1932).
46. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2475, 2476.
47. It should be remembered that the seller is only entitled to the fair
rental value: The rental value of the thing in its defective condition. The
trial court has discretion in determining this value but there are elements
which must be considered. The rental charge should be the value the thing
would produce on the market in the long run. It would be absurd to use
the short run values such as daily car rental rates, motel rates, etc. Other
factors which commonly determine market prices should be used: utility,
convenience, dependability.
When the seller is in bad faith damages must be determined. These are
generally losses incurred and the profits of which the buyer has been de-
prived. The losses of the buyer may include some of the same elements
used to determine market value: inconvenience, lack of dependability, etc.
Beyond these are the most important damage claims: losses by injury and
the accompanying medical expenses, mental distress and aggravation, and
pain and suffering. For purposes of clarity, fair rental value and damages
should be calculated separately.
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the seller to collect these rents only when the buyer chooses to
rent the thing out himself so that his return could technically
be classified as fruits; and then to deny the seller these rents
when the buyer chooses to use the thing himself. In either case
the principles of restitution require that the seller be restored
what he has lost-the fair rental value of the thing, albeit de-
fective.
Nor should it matter if the sale was for cash, on credit, in
good faith, or in bad faith; the solution should be the same. If
the sale was for cash, the seller would be bound to restore the
price, plus interest, from the day he was paid, and to reimburse
the expenses occasioned by the sale. This sum would be offset
by the fruits which the thing produced and/or was capable of
producing. If the sale was on credit or the price only partially
paid, the buyer would have lost no interest or only the interest
on the amount paid while the seller would have been out of
possession of the whole thing. The seller would still be entitled
to the fruits less no interest or interest on the partial price paid.
If the seller was in bad faith, it might seem that the buyer's
consent has been vitiated and the sale would be rescinded on the
basis of fraud.4 However, the very presence of articles 2545 4
and 254650 indicate the drafters' intention of treating the situa-
tion in the same manner as if the seller had been in good faith-
as an action in resolution."' By imposing on the bad faith seller
the obligation to pay damages and by extending the prescriptive
period, the fraudulent conduct is reprimanded, and an apparent
inconsistency of theories is eliminated. If, however, the seller
makes a declaration of quality, which quality is the buyer's
principal motive in the contract, and it develops that this specific
quality is lacking, then the buyer should be able to rescind the
sale for error or fraud.52
The Bergeron case is a good example of how the rule should
work; however, the court failed to base its conclusion on solid
legal principles. The Kiefer case demonstrates how the rule
48. See LA. CIv. COns art. 1847.
49. Id. art. 2545: "The seller, who knows the vice of the thing he sells
and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of the price and repayment
of the expenses, is answerable to the buyer in damages."
50. Id. art. 2546: "In this case, the action for redhibition may be com-
menced at any time, provided a year has not elapsed since the discovery
of the vice."
51. See PLANIOL ET R PERT, TRAnIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 126
(1932).
52. See note 39 supra.
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should work when the seller is in bad faith,5 8 but here also the
opinion does not show a basis for the holding. Possible hardships
caused by the holdings of older cases when applied to automobile
sales might have persuaded the courts to alter their positions.
The fact that an automobile's value depreciates so quickly focuses
attention on the seller's situation in redhibition.54 The result in
these two cases are correct, but the courts in the future should
reconsider the nature of the redhibitory action in developing
sound legal foundations for their conclusions.
Michael G. Page
TORTS OFFSHORE-THE RODRIGUE
INTERPRETATION OF THE LANDS ACT
An offshore worker fell to his death on the floor of an arti-
ficial island more than one marine league off the Louisiana gulf
shore. Decedent's widow and two children brought actions in
the federal district court for the eastern district of Louisiana
based on the Death on the High Seas Act' (hereinafter the
"Seas Act") and Louisiana's general tort recovery statute2 al-
legedly made applicable by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act8 (hereinafter the "Lands Act"). The district court reasoned
that since the Seas Act provided a federal remedy inconsistent
with the Louisiana statute, the latter could not be urged via the
Lands Act.4 That portion of the actions based on the Louisiana
statute was dismissed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's dismissal." Certiorari was granted in
this and a closely analogous case," and the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that petitioners' remedy was under the Lands
53. The court apparently took into account the buyer's extravagant
claims for damages in computing the fair rental value of the car. To avoid
theoretical confusion, perhaps it would be advantageous for the court to
compute fair use value and damages to be paid the buyer separately. See
note 47 supra.
54. See Gauche v. Ford Motor Co., 226 So.2d 198, 207 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969). The court treated depreciation and the buyer's use as interchangeable
terms.
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1920).
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.
3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1953).
4. Id. § 1333(a) (2) provides: "To the extent that they are applicable and
not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regu-
lations . . . , the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State , . . are de-
clared to be the law of the United States for . . . the subsoil and seabed of
the Outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures
thereon .... " (emphasis added).
5. 395 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968).
6. Dore v. Link Belt Co., 391 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968).
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